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Robert C. Feenstra 
A magazine devoted to international economics recently asked a panel of ex- 
perts to grade the performance  of the Japadtrade policies undertaken by the 
Clinton administration (“Grading the Clinton JapadTrade Policy” 1994). The 
results ranged from B + to Z, with the latter being lower than an F.  Less surpris- 
ing than the range of scores (who would expect economists to agree?) was the 
attention given by nearly every person to the market-opening policies being 
pursued by  the United States. Gone are the days in which the United States 
was evaluated by its ability to negotiate multilateral policies of mutual bene- 
fit to a broad group of  countries; instead, the focus is on results-oriented poli- 
cies in  specific markets  and with particular  trading partners. There is little 
agreement,  however,  on whether the policies pursued  have been  helpful  or 
harmful: the two lowest grades given to the Clinton administration came from 
individuals who felt that the actions taken toward Japan were either too harsh 
and a form of “affirmation action” promoting U.S. industries or too weak and 
“likely to prove ephemeral.”  Such is the state of affairs in the evaluation of 
recent US. trade policies! 
The papers in this volume take a more dispassionate look at these policies 
and evaluate their effect with the benefit of hindsight and statistical inference. 
Of foremost concern  are the policies affecting US.-Japan trade and invest- 
ment, and nearly half the papers focus on these issues. A second section of the 
volume deals with the U.S.  response to so-called unfair trading practices, while 
the final section contains an analysis of various industry- and country-specific 
trade policies. Three general themes  arise from the papers. The first is that 
some policies can act as both import protection and export promotion. An ex- 
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ample is provided by the recent policies directed at the U.S. automobile indus- 
try, as examined by James Levinsohn. In that case, the goal of increasing Japa- 
nese  purchases  of  U.S.  auto  parts  (export  promotion)  was  implemented 
through  the threat of  high tariffs on U.S.  imports  of Japanese luxury autos 
(import protection), with the result that the two cannot really be separated. A 
more complex example comes from the negotiations on antidumping in the 
Uruguay  Round,  discussed  by  Robert  E.  Cumby  and Theodore H. Moran, 
where U.S. exporting and multinational firms-pursuing  their own agendas- 
did not  act as an effective counterweight  to domestic firms  seeking greater 
protection from imports. 
The second  general  theme is that  the threat of  protection  can  often  have 
effects that are as pronounced as when policies are actually implemented. This 
is illustrated by the response of the Japanese to the threatened tariffs on luxury 
automobiles but also by their response to threatened protection in other indus- 
tries, which involved making direct investments in the United States, as ana- 
lyzed by Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra. Threats also lead to mea- 
surable reactions from firms faced with possible antidumping duties, discussed 
by  Thomas J. Prusa, and from countries faced with Section 301 actions, dis- 
cussed  by  Kimberly Ann Elliott  and J. David  Richardson  in the  section  on 
“unfair” trade. The third theme is that domestic regulatory policy has as much 
effect on trade and investment patterns as trade policy itself. This is illustrated 
by the paper by Andrew R. Dick, dealing with the telecommunications indus- 
try; by the paper by David E. Weinstein, dealing with foreign investment in 
Japan; and by  the papers in the final section, which  deal with the effect  of 
macroeconomic policy on U.S. wheat exports and on unemployment in Canada 
following the free trade agreement with the United States. 
Arguably, the automobile industry-defined  to include both  finished cars 
and the manufacture of automobile part-received  the most trade policy at- 
tention throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  The import competition faced by U.S. 
producers during the 1980s was offset by the application of a “voluntary” ex- 
port restraint (VER) with Japan. This restraint had the further effect of encour- 
aging foreign investment in the United States, as a result of which, with Jap- 
anese nameplates being produced in the United States, the VER became redun- 
dant by the end of  the decade. Attention then shifted to the automobile parts 
industry, which had a very low foreign market share in Japan. In an effort to 
expand this share, the Clinton administration proposed a 100 percent tariff on 
thirteen Japanese luxury cars and threatened to implement this tariff unless the 
Japanese agreed to expand their purchases of automobile parts. The choice of 
instrument was strategic: a uniform tariff against all Japanese automobile im- 
ports would not have been effective since the majority of Japanese cars were 
produced in the United States. In this case, the threat apparently paid off, in 
that the Japanese agreed to various quantitative goals for the purchase of auto- 
mobile parts. Levinsohn considers what would have happened had the tariff on 
luxury cars been  implemented. He finds that  the reduction  in profits  of  the 3  Introduction 
Japanese manufacturers would have been very large, which may explain their 
decision to agree to various goals for the purchase of automobile parts. Surpris- 
ingly, he also finds that US.  prices would have risen by nearly the full amount 
of the tariffs: there would have been little incentive for the Japanese producers 
to absorb some part of the tariff and pass though only a portion to U.S. con- 
sumers. 
Among the quantitative goals gained in this “carwars” episode, the Japanese 
agreed that their firms in the United  States, and elsewhere would purchase 
more automobile parts; that they would increase the foreign market share in 
Japan; and that they would expand their transplant production in the United 
States. It can be questioned whether some of these targets could have been met 
even without the U.S. threat. In particular, the number of Japanese manufactur- 
ers in the United States has been rising steadily, and these firms all do some 
business with U.S. parts suppliers. The changing magnitude of these parts pur- 
chases is studied by Deborah L. Swenson. She makes use of a unique data set 
collected  from the  foreign  trade  zones  (FTZs) in  the  United  States  within 
which  the  Japanese  automobile  producers  (and many  other  firms)  operate. 
Since these data provide trade flows to and from FTZs, the separate purchases 
of U.S. and Japanese parts can be quantified, and the effect of exchange rates 
and other factors on the sourcing decision can be estimated.  Swenson finds 
that exchange rate fluctuations are important, and that there is a tendency for 
Japanese purchases  of  U.S. parts to grow over time, but this growth is not 
enough for the differences between these firms and their U.S. counterparts to 
be eliminated. 
It was suggested above that the VER with Japan in automobiles resulted in 
the inflow of foreign direct investment. It is surprising, however, that the num- 
ber of  transplant firms grew so large that the VER became redundant. This 
suggests that the foreign firms were responding, not only to the actual protec- 
tion, but also to the threat of protection. This hypothesis is tested by Blonigen 
and Feenstra, who measure the threat of  protection by  the initiation of  anti- 
dumping or “escape clause” cases filed against a particular foreign industry. 
They test whether the use of these cases results in additional inflows of foreign 
direct investment and, conversely, whether the foreign investment lowers the 
probability  of future protection.  Using data on inflows of  Japanese firms to 
the United States, support for both these hypotheses is obtained. These results 
confirm the idea of  quid pro quo foreign investment that has been advanced 
by  Jagdish Bhagwati, among others (see the references  to chapter  3  of  this 
volume). 
Looking at the opposite side of  this issue, Weinstein investigates the level 
and determinants of foreign direct investment in Japan. The conventional wis- 
dom has been that, measured by the share of employment or sales accounted 
for by  foreign affiliates,  the foreign presence in Japan is at most  1 percent. 
This is extremely low in comparison with other industrial countries. Weinstein 
argues that this estimate is in fact incorrect and that the actual foreign presence 4  Robert C. Feenstra 
is at least 5 percent of  sales or employment: still at the low end compared to 
other countries, but five times higher than the conventional wisdom! To explain 
why foreign investment has not been higher, many authors have pointed to the 
keiretsu system of  cross-shareholding and corporate control. Weinstein ques- 
tions  whether this  system developed in order to limit foreign takeovers. He 
suggests instead that various Japanese financial regulations have had the effect 
of encouraging cross-shareholding between manufacturing and financial firms 
and among related firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Regulatory policies are also the focus of the paper by Dick, dealing with the 
telecommunications  industry  in  the  United  States  and  Japan.  In  the  early 
1990s, the attempts of Motorola to enter the cellular telephone market in the 
Tokyo area led to extended discussions between government officials from the 
United States and Japan, which mirrored similar attempts to enter the market 
for radio pagers in the 1980s. Dick puts these actions into their historical con- 
text,  arguing that deregulation in both  countries since the  1970s, has had a 
profound effect on bilateral trade. Deregulation in the United States, including 
the divestiture of AT&T, had the effect of increasing imports from Japan (espe- 
cially of terminal equipment) and other countries such as Canada (of network 
equipment).  But deregulation  in Japan had the effect  of  increasing  imports 
from Hong  Kong and Asia  (of terminal  equipment),  with  more limited  in- 
creases of  imports from Canada (of network equipment), with the result that 
the United States did not gain in terms of exports. The conclusion is that the 
vigorous  enforcement  of  antitrust  law  in  the  United  States  (leading  to  the 
AT&T divestiture) had the effect of  increasing the  trade deficit with  Japan, 
where comparable deregulation policies were not followed. 
The second section of the volume is devoted to policies that are a response 
to “unfair trade,” that is, situations in which the United  States perceives that 
foreign industries or countries are engaged in practices particularly detrimental 
to domestic interests. An example is dumping: when foreign industries export 
their products at below their home prices or average costs. This practice has 
long justified the use of antidumping duties under U.S. and multilateral trade 
laws, but these provisions were renegotiated under the Uruguay Round of ne- 
gotiations. The paper by Cumby and Moran argues that the new provisions are 
surprisingly lenient in terms of the criteria used to determine whether dumping 
has occurred and that they therefore protect domestic producers. The question 
that the authors pose is why the executive branch of the government  did not 
act as an effective counterweight  to industry demands in this instance. The 
answer leads to a fascinating insiders’ account of negotiations during the Uru- 
guay Round, in which, as one discussant observed, the “names were omitted 
to protect the guilty.” 
One reason that  these  authors focus on the  antidumping  laws is because 
these trade policies have been found to have very substantial effects, over and 
above those that occur when duties are actually applied. The paper by Prusa 
investigates  some of  these  effects. Using highly  disaggregated  data for the 5  Introduction 
same line-item tariff codes at which investigations occur, he finds that the in- 
vestigation itself has the effect of restricting imports and raising the price from 
the countries named in the investigation;  of  course, these effects persist and 
are amplified if duties are applied. However, the net protection offered to U.S. 
firms is less than these results suggest because of  significant trade diversion 
toward countries that are not named in the investigation. These countries are 
able to increase their import volumes to the United States and raise their prices 
following the application of duties on the named countries, with the result that 
the overall volume of  imports continues to grow. In addition to quantifying the 
effect of antidumping investigations on import prices, Prusa provides the first 
estimates of the extent of trade diversion to nonnamed countries. 
The use of antidumping duties is only one means by which the United States 
responds to perceived unfair trade, and, by necessity, this practice is restricted 
to particular commodities and countries. A more general response is contained 
in  Section 301 of  the Trade Act of  1974, which authorized the president to 
take action against “unreasonable, unjustifiable,  or discriminatory” practices 
of foreign trade partners. These provisions were extended in the so-called Su- 
per  301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988, 
which authorized the annual compilation of a list of countries engaged in egre- 
giously unfair practices and subsequent negotiations to eliminate these prac- 
tices. If the practices are indeed eliminated, then the action can be judged as 
“successful” from the U.S. point of view. Elliott and Richardson investigate 
the factors contributing to the perceived success or failure of the Section 301 
actions. This study extends the work presented in Bayard and Elliot (1994) and 
adds to it a statistical analysis of  the factors determining success (the earlier 
study used case methods). Among other conclusions, the authors find that the 
vulnerability of the foreign country influences the success of a 301 action, as 
does the simplicity of the foreign policies being targeted and the linkage of the 
action of some measure of reciprocity. In contrast, there is no evidence that 
cases involving the highest U.S. stakes are necessarily the most successful. 
The final section of the volume  turns to U.S. policies that  have targeted 
specific industries or countries.  Of chief  concern  to advocates of industrial 
policy has been the high-technology industries, which are sometimes argued 
to benefit other industries in a spillover process and to be of  strategic interest 
for national security. Both these arguments have been used to justify U.S. sup- 
port for the development of  flat panel displays, as described by Kala Krishna 
and Marie Thursby. Much of the information on this industry is proprietary, 
and these authors provide details that are not readily available, including the 
very  high  magnitude  of  subsidies  provided  by  the  Clinton  administration. 
Rather  than evaluating the overall  social cost or benefit  of these  subsidies, 
Krishna and Thursby focus on one particular aspect that is also of relevance to 
other industries: whether subsidies are provided to capacity acquisition or to 
R&D expenditures.  Both these policies were considered  under the National 
Flat Panel Display Initiative. These authors find that subsidies to capacity ac- 6  Robert C. Feenstra 
quisition  can have the perverse  effect  of  reducing  the steady-state  level  of 
R&D, which implies  that the  R&D subsidy is the preferred  instrument for 
achieving long-term cost reductions. 
The second industry considered-agriculture-is  at the opposite end of the 
spectrum in that the subsidies provided cannot be justified by any technological 
spillover or national  security argument  but rather  are the result  of  political 
economy considerations. One program that has been in effect since 1985 is the 
Export Enhancement  Program (EEP),  which provides  export subsidies to a 
range of  commodities, especially wheat. In 1985, exports of  wheat were very 
low by historical  standards, leading to a large accumulation of U.S. stocks. 
Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter argue that these events should 
be attributed to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar during 1980-85.  With the 
subsequent depreciation, export volumes should have returned to their histori- 
cal levels, but this was not the case: exports were lower than expected. One 
explanation for this finding is the increased productivity and export subsidies 
provided  to wheat by  the European Community. These findings suggest that 
the EEP was ineffective in stimulating wheat exports and that, to the extent 
that it led to the increased use of  subsidies within Europe, it may even have 
been counterproductive. 
Attention is turned from policies favoring  specific industries to those fa- 
voring specific geographic locations in the paper by Gordon H. Hanson. Under 
the offshore assembly provisions of US. tariff laws, components that are ex- 
ported, assembled abroad, and reimported into the United States receive pref- 
erential tariff  treatment. Predictably,  this provision  has had the effect of  en- 
couraging the location of plants in Mexico near the U.S. border. Surprisingly, 
however, it has also encouraged  the location of  “twin plants” in the United 
States, at border cities near to their Mexican counterparts. Hanson estimates 
that fully half the growth in durable-goods activities in these U.S. cities is due 
to the expansion  of  assembly plants in Mexico. He also discusses  how the 
choice of location is likely to be affected by  the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 
The final paper, by Keith Head and John Ries, considers the other American 
border-that  with  Canada-and  the  effect  of  the  Canada-U.S.  Free Trade 
Agreement of  1988. While this agreement attracted less attention in the United 
States  than  the  subsequent  agreement  with  Mexico  under  NAFTA,  it  was 
widely debated and criticized in Canada. The fear was that Canadian industries 
would not be able to compete head-on with U.S. industries and would therefore 
be forced to downsize and lay off workers. In fact, in the years following the 
agreement, there was unusually high unemployment in Canada, but this was 
due at least in part to the restrictive monetary policy. Head and Ries attempt 
to disentangle from industry-level data the changes in Canadian output and 
employment that were consistent with trade liberalization and the remaining 
changes that appear to be due to other factors. Using a model of monopolistic 
competition, they find that a significant part of the reduction in Canadian out- 7  Introduction 
put cannot be explained by this framework. They explore the extent to which 
macroeconomic policy, or other factors, is consistent with the additional unem- 
ployment that occurred. 
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